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Abstract. As people use an increasing number of smart devices for their
everyday computing, it is surprising that these powerful, internet-enabled
devices are rarely connected together to create personal networks. The
webinos project is an attempt to make this possible so that resources can
easily be shared between devices, regardless of the operating system or
network they are using. However, increased connectivity raises a number
of security and privacy issues, and in this paper we introduce a public
key infrastructure designed to be suitable for personal computing across
multiple devices. We recognize the need for our PKI to work on both
mobile and home networks, use existing online user identities and take
into consideration the different interaction styles found on smart devices
in different form factors. We propose a set of principles for personal key
infrastructures, describe our implementation and outline how it mitigates
common threats and issues.
1 Introduction
We have slowly seen a move away from personal computers towards personal
computing : while PCs are still widely used, nowadays people tend also to have
a multitude of other form factors, such as tablets, smartphones, set-top boxes
and in-car computers. Likewise, personal computing now involves multiple de-
vices, both private and shared, as well as a growing number of personal internet
services.
Home and personal area networks have been researched and developed to
manage the personal usage of multiple computers [1,2,3,4]. These typically fo-
cus on creating secure networks of devices that are co-located either physically
or logically, such as on a home wireless network. This has simplified adminis-
tration and the sharing of resources, however the home networking concept has
been slow to adapt to mobile devices and online services. For example, a home
network tends to use only one medium, such as WiFi, and therefore cannot en-
compass mobile devices which often connect from remote locations via mobile
data. Therefore, we argue for the creation of personal networks [5] rather than
home networks to better suit the needs of personal computing.
Lacking a suitable personal network, users frequently rely on multiple, dis-
parate cloud services and applications for interoperability; these are accessible
from any device with an internet connection, regardless of geographic location
or network medium [6]. However, this increases reliance on cloud storage, web
applications and internet connectivity, as well as a myriad of different policies,
usage patterns and trust relationships. A personal network, which we define as
the set of all devices and resources used by a particular person or group, could
provide a viable alternative which doesn’t rely on multiple third party cloud
providers, and provides a consistent model for interoperability and security.
Security and privacy issues are rife in personal networking. Smart devices
store data with both personal and monetary value. The impact of device theft
or compromise is substantial, and the increasing number and mobility of personal
devices only makes it more likely. The trend towards cloud services does not nec-
essarily help: web browsers may store passwords, and are thus pre-authenticated
to these cloud services. Furthermore, cloud-based data may be cached locally for
efficiency and connectivity reasons, leaving the user open to numerous attacks.
The rise of mobile applications has also highlighted privacy issues, particularly
in personal and home contexts. Access to location, camera, and other sensors can
result in both accidental and deliberate privacy violations. Recent high-profile
breaches have garnered concern from users regarding privacy issues, and the
problem is gaining traction in the research community [7,8].
Access control can solve many security and privacy problems, in particular
when combined with strong authentication of users and devices, which could be
provided through a public key infrastructure. However, no suitable PKI exists:
the web PKI model is adequate for authenticating websites, but inappropriate
for identifying individual devices and users. Home PKIs (such as UPnP Device
Protection [9]) might work for authenticating devices, but cannot interoperate
with those on mobile networks. User-based PKIs suffer from usability problems
[10], and fail to leverage user identities established by social networks and web-
sites. This motivates the need for a suitable PKI for personal networks capable
of protecting user security and privacy.
In this paper we take a fresh look at PKI for personal networks, based on
these observations as well as the state of the art in home networking. In section 2
we discuss related work on PKI in a personal and home context and use these
and our own experiences in section 3 to elicit the key threats to personal net-
works. We then give design principles for a personal PKI in section 4, proposing
the use of internet protocols, web technologies and existing authentication and
discovery mechanisms. Section 5 presents the webinos PKI system, a realization
of these principles, and describes security features including certificate manage-
ment, network discovery and revocation. In section 6 we evaluate webinos and its
initial implementation against the identified threats, discuss how a personal PKI
could be migrated and compare with an alternative capability-based approach.
Finally, in section 7 we conclude.
2 Related work
ITU-T Recommendation X.1112 [11] presents two models for home network de-
vice certification. In one model, all home device certificates are issued by an
external CA essentially resulting in a global PKI. In the other model, an in-
ternal CA is used to generate keys and certificates for home devices. A secure
home gateway can be used for this purpose; this can have a device certificate
issued by an external CA to facilitate authentication between the home network
and external service providers. Kinkelin et al. [1] make a similar distinction be-
tween the two models; they suggest that trust relationships can be built between
internal CAs based on the social relationships between home networks owners.
We extend this concept to devices on mobile networks, and propose a certificate
exchange process based on online identities.
The recently standardized UPnP Device Protection (UPnP-DP) service [9]
uses PKI in a home network context. This service allows a device to restrict
access to specific UPnP operations or resources. In UPnP-DP, device identity
is provided by means of self-signed X.509 certificates on each device. Before
accessing restricted services or resources, devices must first be paired with each
other. As explained by Baugher and Lortz [12], device pairing uses the same
mechanisms as WiFi Protected Setup (WPS) and avoids exposing the underlying
PKI to the user. In order to enforce the principle of least privilege, UPnP-DP
uses three roles: Public, Basic, and Admin. The webinos system described in
section 5 uses a similar combination of X.509 certificates and device pairing but
defines slightly different levels of privilege and certificate hierarchies.
The use of public key infrastructures in personal area networks (PANs) has
been investigated previously as part of the SHAMAN project [4] and in related
work by Mitchell and Schaffelhofer [3]. To adapt conventional PKI for use in a
PAN, one of the devices in the PAN acts as a ‘Personal CA’, issuing certificates to
other devices. The final SHAMAN technical reports discuss the operation of the
personal CA as well as mechanisms for device initialization, proof of possession
of key pairs and revocation in PAN PKIs. The limited availability of the personal
CA and the risk of this device being lost or stolen have been identified as potential
issues. The proposed mitigation involves the use of multiple CAs, but requires
additional synchronization steps. The alternative proposed in this paper involves
making the CA a cloud-based web service.
Ford et al. [13] propose the ‘Unmanaged Internet Architecture’ (UIA) in order
to provide connectivity between mobile devices independent of network location.
All devices are given a personal name and belong in a personal group. Devices
in the same group can access one another. No central infrastructure is required,
and users only deal with convenient names rather than device addresses. Parts of
this approach are a generalization of the webinos personal zone model discussed
in section 5. However, we suspect that UIA would rapidly end up resembling a
webinos-like network due to the prevalence of NAT and mobile networks, forcing
at least one device to become a permanently-addressable router. Furthermore,
user authentication is not fully addressed, and the proposed approach does not
take advantage of existing user identities.
Kubota and Miyake [14] suggest that secure DNS domains can be created for
personal networks through DNSSEC. In their scheme, the hash of the domain
public key is itself a pseudo domain name that anyone can verify. This has
the advantage of requiring no change to client applications, only changes to the
DNS resolver mechanism. Secure collaborations between domains can be created
purely through knowledge of the pseudo domain name. However, challenges such
as discovery of the pseudo domain name and key management issues such as
revocation remain unresolved.
3 Personal network definition and threats
We define a personal network as a set of communicating devices belonging to (or
are used by) a particular individual. Personal networks may include devices in
different form factors and operating on different physical networks. Both inter-
and intra-network communication are supported, so that each device within the
personal network can communicate with others, but also devices outside the
personal network can connect in order to facilitate sharing of data or services
between users. Personal networks may include online services and even virtual
cloud-based devices. Finally, personal networks may also provide synchronization
of data and settings in order to maintain a seamless user experience between
devices.
Home and personal networks of devices face a number of threats to user
security and privacy. The key assets requiring protection in a personal network
are the devices themselves, each of which may hold user credentials and may have
access to valuable services such as pay-per-view television. The network may also
provide internet connectivity through potentially expensive mobile networks.
Personal data, such as user location history and browsing preferences, must be
protected for privacy reasons. Personal devices may be used to access work data
and so attacks may put valuable intellectual property at risk.
The following five threat categories have been identified. We use data from
existing analyses [15,12,16] as well as threats discovered as part of the webinos
project [17] which are relevant to home or personal scenarios. We ignore issues
commonly dealt with at lower layers in the communication stack, such as com-
munication jamming, as well as potential weaknesses in standard cryptography.
We also focus primarily on the end user as a stakeholder, rather than third party
software or service providers.
Unauthorized physical access to personal networks. This includes the theft
of an authorized device, or the misuse of a device residing in a shared context.
Vulnerabilities may be due to weak or stolen authentication credentials (e.g.
an easily-guessed or shoulder-surfed password). Shoulder-surfing can also re-
sult in disclosure of other private data, particularly for shared devices such
as a communal television or tablet PC. Sharing a physical network (such as
home WiFi) can implicitly authorize access to a home router or administra-
tion console, which facilitates attacks such as adding rogue devices to the
trusted network. Baugher and Lortz [12] suggest that three tiers of access
are therefore required: guest, user, and administrator.
Unauthorized remote access to personal networks. This may be the re-
sult of weak credentials on a personal device accessible from the internet,
or the compromise of a cloud-based network service. Weak access control
policies or flawed protocols might allow an attacker to send requests to a
personal network device over the internet and extract valuable data. For
instance, an attacker may use port scanning to find a personal network de-
vice which exposes the local file system through a well-known API, or a
vulnerable remote login service may be publicly-exposed.
Malicious software. Malware may collect private data for sale or identity
theft, or misuse access to valuable resources such as online bank accounts.
It may misuse a device’s internet access by participating in botnets for dis-
tributed denial of service attacks. As well as its impact on the attack’s target,
this might affect the device’s performance and cost money if bandwidth is
expensive. Malware can be invoked through some action on the part of the
user – perhaps a phishing attempt, or after an attack on an app store [18] –
or through a runtime exploit of the web browser or operating system.
Intercepting and modifying network communication. Insecure networks
could allow session hijacking, misuse of user authentication at a remote ser-
vice or on the device, or simply eavesdropping on any unencrypted traffic.
While some network link types may mitigate these attacks, the number of
these (WiFi, Bluetooth, mobile data, and so on) means such measures are not
always assured. Furthermore, the security perimeter of the personal network
likely differs from that of the network link currently in use.
Misuse of device interoperability. The interoperation of multiple devices
creates a new class of threat [19]. Security is a weakest-link problem: the
weakest personal device can potentially be used as a gateway to the rest of
the network. Furthermore, any synchronization of data or settings between
devices can be used as an attack vector; if any device can be made to poi-
son the synchronized data, it could plant attacks against vulnerabilities in
another. Personal networks may also result in greater replication of data,
increasing the impact of any compromise.
4 Principles for Personal Key Infrastructures
Existing work on personal area networks [4] and personal certificate authorities
has not taken into account the variety of smart devices or online identities. In
this section we propose a set of design principles for a personal network.
Leverage existing identities. People already have identities on the web: their
social networks, email accounts, and homepages. These should be reused in
public key infrastructures. We suggest that a mapping from a social network
identity to a public key or certificate should be created, and that users should
be able to find each other through this web-based identity. This takes advan-
tage of existing relationships and therefore avoids the discovery and boot-
strapping problems often associated with PKI [20]. Furthermore, as these
identities are web-based, they do not rely on the user having a particular
piece of hardware with them at any time.
Assume devices are mobile. Tablets, smartphones, laptops, and cars are all
designed to be mobile. This significantly increases the risk of a device being
lost or stolen. As a result, revocation must be primarily concerned with
removing a lost and potentially rogue device from the personal network, and
must also not rely on the user having another enrolled device to hand.
Avoid using PKI metaphors. End users should not be expected to under-
stand PKI terminology. This implies that all keys and certificates should be
generated automatically, and there should never be a prompt or question
asked to users referring to these things. Instead, friendly names and exist-
ing identities should be used. This is in line with suggestions by Balfanz et
al. [20], and we agree with Ford et al. [13] that a combination of user and
device identities should be used.
Use web technologies to make networks interoperable. Many existing home
PKIs expect to operate within a single local area network, and so do not scale
to cover devices which may be on mobile networks with frequently chang-
ing IP addresses. The interoperability of web applications – which provide
a common, accessible web server for communication – should be re-used to
make personal networks available to any device capable of making outgoing
connections to web servers.
Delegate key storage to operating systems. The best way to protect pri-
vate keys is likely to be device-specific. For example, some devices support
secure hardware which may provide a high level of protection. Furthermore,
devices in different contexts will have different authentication requirements:
e.g., a shared PC might only unlock private keys after authenticating the end
user, whereas a mobile device may be assumed to belong to one person only.
Similarly, each platform has different application security infrastructures, so
protection from malware is hard to achieve in a truly cross-platform man-
ner. We suggest, therefore, that key storage be delegated to the operating
system, which already has to deal with many of these issues.
Device keys are not always a factor of user authentication. It is tempt-
ing to treat a device-held private key as a factor of user authentication. How-
ever, this ignores the fact that personal devices are designed to be mobile. A
device key should be used to identify the device only, and only as a second
factor when the device is appropriate: e.g., a laptop or mobile phone with
a single user and a login prompt. We propose that another layer of autho-
rization should be used on top of the key infrastructure. This is in contrast
to Balfanz et al.’s ‘instant PKI’ which identifies that certificates could be
treated like capabilities [20].
5 The webinos PKI
In this section we describe the webinos application platform which implements
a novel form of personal network called a personal zone. Personal zones define
the devices used by (and often belonging to) a particular person and have a
public key infrastructure for device authentication. Personal zones have a master
device called a personal zone hub which acts as a certificate authority and can
be implemented as an online web service.
webinos is a cross-platform runtime environment for web applications. Ex-
tending the capabilities provided by a web browser, it provides a set of standard
JavaScript APIs for web applications to use in order to access local device func-
tionality – such as a camera or address book – and to communicate with other
devices both in and out of the users’ personal zone. For example, a web ap-
plication running on a PC would be able to use webinos APIs to access the
camera on a smartphone. webinos also provides an access control policy system
for mediating access to these APIs in order to protect user security and privacy.
In the following subsections we describe the architecture of webinos and how
it implements a personal network PKI system by following the requirements
outlined in the previous section.
5.1 Components and communication
webinos consists of several software components on multiple devices, as shown
in Table 1. Each device has a web runtime and a personal zone proxy (PZP)
running on it. Web applications are displayed and executed in a web runtime
(such as a browser) and communicate with the local personal zone proxy (PZP),
which implements APIs as well as communicating with the personal zone hub
(PZH). The hub is a web-based service which passes messages between prox-
ies, synchronizes access control policies and settings, and provides administra-
tive functions. PZPs can communicate with each other and with the PZH over
mutually-authenticated TLS sessions. The PZH acts as a certificate authority,
issuing certificates to each proxy.
Component Key features and capabilities
Personal Zone Hub (PZH) Web-based, constantly available and addressable, routes
messages, acts as a certificate authority.
Personal Zone Proxy (PZP) Runs on a device and implements APIs. Responsible for
policy enforcement and communicating with the WRT,
PZH and other PZPs.
Web Runtime (WRT) User interface to web applications.
Table 1. Personal zone components
5.2 Certificate hierarchy
The personal zone hub is the certificate authority for a personal zone. The hub
issues a certificate for itself as well as certificates for all proxies in the zone.
These certificates are used to create mutually-authenticated TLS sessions. The
hub also has a web interface, which uses a separate certificate. The CA certificate
can be self-signed, or signed by the service provider who owns the infrastructure
the hub is running on. In the case that one service provider hosts multiple hubs,
the web interface may be authenticated through a different certificate owned by
the service provider. If a user has a reliable home internet connection, then the
hub can optionally be hosted by a home router or server. In this case, either the
CA certificate would be self-signed or signed by the manufacturer. An example
certificate hierarchy is shown in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Certificate hierarchy in webinos
5.3 User discovery
The discovery process in webinos links an existing personal identity - such as an
OpenID account - to a personal zone hub address. We suggest that the WebFin-
ger protocol be employed [21]. This process requires an identity provider to host
an eXtensible Resource Descriptor [22] (XRD) describing how to look up user
identity information, and then an XRD information record per user describing
their links to other resources. This information should be hosted and served by
a trustworthy party over a secure connection. A record for the user ‘Joe Smith’




CA certificates must be exchanged when two devices in different personal zones
communicate for the first time. The following two scenarios describe how certifi-
cate exchange occurs when users are in proximity (e.g. connecting over the same
WiFi network) or when users are connecting remotely over the internet.
Peer-to-peer offline exchange. Exchanging certificates between two users
who are in physical proximity is the device pairing problem [23]. Typical solutions
involve users visually comparing a short code to authenticate a secure channel
created between their devices. We intend to do the same using the SHCBK
key agreement protocol [24] with either a word-matching and number-typing or
repeated numeric comparison scheme [25] for code comparison.
Online exchange. We imagine a scenario where Alice wants to access one of
Bob’s device APIs over the internet, but neither of them have connected to each
other before. We assume that Alice and Bob know each other’s email or social
network identity, but are not in physical proximity.
The first step is discovery. Alice either already knows Bob’s personal zone
hub URL (he may have shared it through email or his address book entry) or
she uses an identifier for Bob (such as his email address) to discover it. She visits
Bob’s PZH URL and requests access to his resources. The request redirects to
Alice’s PZH, which then sends a signed request to Bob’s PZH containing her CA
certificate. Bob’s certificate is automatically added to her zone’s list of known
users. Because Alice had discovered Bob based on an already-known identity
or URL, we assume that no further identity assertion from Bob is required.
However, Bob does not know who Alice is, and needs to connect the request
she makes with her identity as claimed by a mutually-trusted social network.
There are two options. Either Bob’s personal zone hub insists that Alice must
identify herself, using her OpenID credentials to ‘log in’, or Bob performs a
discovery of Alice’s hub URL through the discovery process based on her claimed
identity. Bob’s PZP then downloads Alice’s certificates and he approves or rejects
her request to access resources. The discovery approach has the advantage of
symmetry, and involves no additional work by the personal zone hub. However,
it depends on the popularity and security of the discovery process.
5.5 Enrolment
There are several ways in which new devices can be enrolled into the personal
zone, with the following currently implemented: The process starts with the
webinos PZP software being installed on the new device. The user then visits
the hub’s website and logs in with his or her OpenID credentials. Having logged
in, the user selects ‘add new device’. This tells the hub to temporarily accept
unauthenticated TLS connections. The website also presents the user with a
short string (also encoded as a QR tag) which is used as an authentication
token. This token is entered into the new PZP, along with the URL of the hub.
The PZP then attempts to connect to the hub and is challenged to present a
valid token. After a fixed number of attempts, the hub either issues the PZP
with a signed certificate or rejects the connection.
For future work, we would like to allow a trusted web application to enrol
the user’s device after initial OpenID login. This would simplify the process, but
requires further modification to the web runtime to allow a privileged action to
take place. Another improvement would be for the hub to temporarily support
password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol for new PZP, such as
TLS-SRP [26], using the authentication token as a password. This would remove
the need to accept unauthenticated connections for enrolment.
5.6 Revocation of personal zone devices
Within a personal zone, revocation is implemented through a synchronized cer-
tificate revocation list (CRL) issued by the personal zone hub. This allows the
user to selectively revoke a device by visiting the hub’s web interface and click-
ing a ‘revoke’ button. The CRL is synchronized between devices whenever they
connect to the hub. The choice of CRLs rather than the Online Certificate Sta-
tus Protocol (OCSP) was motivated by a desire for simplicity, as well as the
fact that CRLs for a zone should be small, and that hubs already implement
synchronization for policy enforcement.
Devices which remain offline for significant periods run the risk of having an
out-of-date CRL. A stolen device or compromised key could successfully con-
nect in a peer-to-peer manner with such a device. There are several ways to
mitigate this threat although a perfect solution is impossible, as offline, peer-
to-peer communication between devices is a requirement of webinos. However,
a method analogous to OCSP stapling [27] could be used. Each device could be
required to present an up-to-date CRL for the zone with every new connection.
These CRLs could be issued by the hub on a well-known schedule, such as daily
or weekly. This would limit the window for a malicious device. An alternative
would be to require any device which has not connected to the hub for a certain
time period to reconnect briefly when a peer-to-peer connection is made. Nei-
ther of these solutions is likely to be easily understood by users, and we therefore
do not address this threat at present. For most people who have devices stolen
purely for their intrinsic monetary value rather than as part of a bigger attack,
this seems a reasonable trade-off.
Between personal zones, revocation can be implemented by personal zone
hubs sharing CRLs regularly. This should be reasonable as CRLs ought to remain
small. Revocation of personal zone hubs and migration from one service provider
to another is discussed in section 6.2.
5.7 Access control and authentication
When an API access request is made, the proxy will first check to see whether
the application, device and user are authorized to make the request. This is
implemented through an XACML policy architecture described in [28]. Impor-
tantly, access control policies are synchronized between devices so that general
user-based policies such as ‘Bob may access Alice’s location’ are possible, as well
as specific device and application-based policies such as ‘Application X on device
D can access Alice’s camera on device E’.
The webinos PKI does not assume that device identities automatically map
to individual user identities. For some devices this will be the case, but for
other devices a further level of authentication is required. This means that a
policy applying to Bob might apply to access requests originating from Bob’s
smartphone, but from Bob’s TV it would require Bob to re-authenticate. User
authentication is implemented through Bob logging in with his OpenID account
to the current device (in the case of local access control) or to the personal zone
hub (in the case of remote access control). User authentication is always required
for privileged actions such as modifying policies and adding or removing personal
devices from the zone.
5.8 Key storage
Both TLS keys and the hub’s CA signing key require storing and protecting. On
personal zone proxies, the private key is stored using OS-provided mechanisms.
In particular, we have implemented support for the Mac OS X Keychain and
Gnome Keyring. This delegates the task of releasing TLS keys to the operating
system (or a trusted platform-specific application) which ought to be configured
to understand the context in which the device is used. For example, it might
require a username and password for some shared devices, or simply unlock
keys as soon as the machine has been logged into for the first time. CA keys
are more sensitive – the potential for misuse is greater – and as such must
always be protected by the personal zone hub service provider. Use of the key
requires authentication using OpenID credentials, and the key itself should never
be accessible to any user. This makes it a good candidate for protection using
secure, tamper-proof hardware [1].
5.9 Backup and recovery
The webinos personal zone system does not require an explicit recovery sys-
tem. The OpenID provider will manage loss of passwords or user credentials.
For PZPs, in the instance that a key is compromised or lost the device can be
revoked and then re-added. This requires UI modification but no new underly-
ing functionality. With this in mind, all access control policies and references to
devices in webinos should be to a friendly name rather than public key identity
or certificate serial number. This means that any key can be mapped onto a
particular device name, making the re-issue of keys for a device straightforward.
An advantage of this approach is that keys do not need to be backed-up onto
another device, reducing maintenance overhead.
6 Evaluation and discussion
We have built an open source implementation 4 of webinos for several platforms
including Windows, Linux, Mac, Android and Pandaboard. The prototype is
not complete, but provides a proof-of-concept for the underlying PKI. Although
more analysis is needed, our current experience suggest that it successfully pro-
vides mutual authentication for the combination of users and devices in personal
networks. In the rest of this section we evaluate the webinos PKI with respect
to the threats identified in section 3 and then discuss two issues: how to migrate
a personal zone hub to another service provider, and whether the proposed PKI
compares favourably to a more distributed design using capabilities.
6.1 Mitigating identified threats
Unauthorized physical access to the personal network is an impossible threat to
mitigate purely through software. However, the webinos PKI supports revocation
when a device is lost, and the access control policies limit the authority of any
one device. Shared personal devices are not assumed to have the full authority of
the end user, limiting the impact of this potential vulnerability. Indeed, further
user authentication for privileged actions is required. Because all functionality is
implemented at the application layer, war driving attacks are not possible unless
other vulnerabilities exist. We do not implement the three tiers of access defined
by Baugher and Lortz, but instead identify users and devices independently.
Unauthorized remote access is only possible if someone steals a copy of a
device key, or knows the OpenID credentials of the user. All access to the per-
sonal zone depends on either one of these things. As the OpenID authentication
method is dependent on the identity provider, we assume this can be configured
to be as secure as necessary. Because this authentication process will be well
known to users, it should also limit the likelihood of credential loss and need
for recovery. Theft of a device key is a problem, and might be achieved through
either physical theft or malware. We rely on the local operating system’s key
storage to protect private keys from both of these attacks. In essence, we rely
entirely on existing mechanisms to solve this problem.
Malware is a key threat to webinos considering that it is an application plat-
form. We control all applications within webinos through a policy framework
described in previous work [28]. The policy framework also potentially limits
the impact of one malicious device on the rest of the zone. The design of webi-
nos separates private keys and the proxy software from the web browser using
OS process isolation, which reduces the potential for exploit of the browser. Of
course, malware is still a problem, and future work will consider how attesta-
tion [29] could be employed to eliminate the threat of rootkits.
4 https://developer.webinos.org
The use of mutually-authenticated TLS sessions between all components mit-
igates the threat of interception or modification of network communication. How-
ever, the interoperability of devices does create new attacks. We believe that by
implementing the same security controls on all platforms, we raise the bar of the
weakest device and therefore mitigate at least some of these threats.
6.2 Migration of personal zone hubs
Users may wish to move their personal zone hub to a different service provider
for a number of reasons, such as cost or quality of service. They may also be con-
cerned that their hub provider has been compromised or is behaving maliciously.
One of the goals of webinos is to enhance user control over personal data, so it
is necessary to define how a personal zone hub can be revoked and migrated.
To our knowledge, relatively little work exists on the migration of personal PKI
infrastructures. In this subsection we discuss how this may be achieved in terms
of revocation and certificate management.
One potential scenario is that Alice would like to move her personal zone
hub from provider P to provider Q but neither are assumed to be fundamentally
untrustworthy or insecure. As such, the main challenge is to move her hub data
from P to Q with minimal disruption to her devices and any other users who
connect to her personal zone. Availability is assumed not to be as important
as consistency, as Alice’s personal devices are designed to deal with temporary
loss of connectivity anyway. The process for migrating in this scenario is a rela-
tively straightforward export and import of data, followed by updating the user’s
WebFinger record. It is also likely that keys generated and stored at P will need
to be recreated at Q, as either the user or Q may not trust them. To do this,
existing PZPs would need to make sure the change was authorized by Alice,
import the new PZH keys and have new certificates issued to it. The new PZH
would need to temporarily accept PZPs with old certificates before re-issuing
new ones. Finally, all old certificates would need to be added to the new PZH’s
CRL. External users would update their records by first failing to connect to
P and then re-discovering the user’s new address at Q through WebFinger. We
note that much of this process can be simplified if the personal zone hub is
running on its own virtual machine.
A different solution is required if the old host is not assumed to be trust-
worthy. Users must assume that their PZH keys were compromised, and that
the service provider could impersonate them by accepting requests from remote
parties. Solving this problem requires disconnecting and updating each personal
zone device in turn as well as notifying all external contacts to re-discover the
personal zone hub URL from the user’s WebFinger record. Because this process
may be slow and error-prone, we suggest that users should regularly re-discover
their contacts.
During our risk analysis, we identified migration as a process potentially
vulnerable to attacks in both scenarios. It is necessary to protect the migration
process such that data import and export can only be performed by authorized
users, migration cannot be used as a denial of service against a user, and the
updating of certificates does not allow a rogue device to join the personal zone.
Finally, much of the security of the personal zone hub comes down to reliance
on the OpenID provider and WebFinger account. We leave protecting these as
future work, but note that OpenID is flexible in it’s own authentication methods
and can support multiple factors to enhance security.
6.3 Comparison with a capabilities-based approach
The webinos PKI relies heavily on the personal zone hub to identify and au-
thenticate users and devices. An alternative, distributed approach would be to
use capability-based security [30]. In such a system, each security principal –
which could be a device, user, or application – can possess its own ‘keyring’ of
capabilities, each of which represents access to a single resource. These can then
be delegated to other parties in a controlled manner. For example, a smartphone
application could have access to the local camera API, and the laptop’s secure
storage facility, but not the laptop’s webcam; it would possess capabilities to
the first two resources, but not the third. This removes the need for a central
identity authority, PKI infrastructure and policy-based access control.
Capabilities, therefore, simplify and reduce the trust required in the personal
zone hub, which would only need to provide routing and communication. In
addition, performance-intensive XML policy processing is no longer required
on each device, and no synchronization of policies is necessary. Peer-to-peer
operation is more flexible: since capability issuance decisions are inherently made
locally, rights to a feature on one device can easily be issued to another, within or
outside the personal zone, removing the need for certificate exchange. Similarly,
delegation and revocation of rights is straightforward. Such a model would also
fit with the use of web token-based authentication approaches such as OAuth.
However, there are some disadvantages. In particular, the existence of a cen-
tral security authority is convenient for auditing privileged actions, such as
adding devices to the zone. In contrast, a capability-based model for webinos
would need to include auditing of every capability issuance event to a global
log. Furthermore, as communicating with devices on mobile networks requires a
central access point, such as a personal zone hub, for routing and communication
purposes anyway, introducing capabilities can never completely eliminate cen-
tralization. Other issues with auditing delegation and creating secure channels
would also need to be solved.
7 Conclusion
We have introduced a PKI infrastructure to support personal networks based
on the new requirements and usage patterns created by the popularity of smart
devices and applications. We have developed an initial implementation on mul-
tiple platforms, including Windows, Android and Linux as part of the webinos
project. Our system helps mitigate many identified threats of home and per-
sonal networks, and we have defined methods for discovery, certificate exchange,
enrolment, revocation and key storage. webinos does not require any additional
usernames or passwords, and almost exclusively uses existing protocols. We have
provided a theoretical comparison with an alternative access control approach
and evaluated our system against identified threats.
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